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Abstract 
This study investigates the impact of the degree of financial distress on the earnings management 
activities of Italian non-listed firms. The extant literature provides mixed evidence on this 
relationship for listed firms. We find a positive (negative) relationship between financial distress 
risk and income-decreasing (income-increasing) earnings management, suggesting that firms tend 
to manage earnings downward as financial distress risk (proxied by Altman’s Z-Score) increases. 
Consistent with the Jensen control hypothesis, stressed firms are more likely to reveal their weak 
financial performance to stakeholders in order to renegotiate their debt on better terms and to 
signal the manager’s willingness to deal with these problems to stakeholders (e.g. lenders and 
auditors). In two robustness tests, we test the power of the Kothari et al. (2005) model for 
decomposing total accruals and we also analyse a reduced firm sample representing over 80% of 
the population. We employ a linear regression model controlling for heteroschedasticity and 
autocorrelation using the Petersen method. The dependent variable is continuous and proxies 
negative discretionary accruals (DA) by setting positive (DA) to zero since we hypothesise that 
managers of distressed firms are more likely to manage earnings downward than healthy firms. 
Distress is proxied by the Altman Z-score measure for non-listed firms. Our research has several 
implications for academics, practitioners, lenders, and national standard setters, showing that, in 
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contrast to the extant literature, non-listed firms are more likely to manage earnings downward as 
their financial situation deteriorates. The non-listed firm context is important to academics as such 
firms are the majority in many countries, and the financial distress literature concerning them is 
underdeveloped. Practitioners and lenders may be less concerned about the deterioration of 
borrower financial performance as such firms are more likely to manage their earnings downward 
to highlight performance issues. Furthermore, our findings are of interest to national standard 
setters and professional accountants who are concerned with advanced warning indicators of firm 
financial problems such as Altman’s Z-score, especially in recent years in which countries are 
focused on developing robust empirical models to detect firm financial difficulties. 
 
Keywords: financial distress; Altman’s Z-score; accrual-based earnings management; non-listed 
firms; Italian context.  
 





The Impact of Financial Difficulties on Earnings Management 
Strategies: The Case of Italian Non-Listed Firms 
 
Introduction 
   Financial information plays an important role in mitigating agency problems between 
firm owners and lenders and other creditors who are concerned with the real financial 
performance of firms that they currently or potentially provide with finance. Where 
financial performance deteriorates, firms run the risk of having to repay lenders and 
creditors early, thereby reducing their borrowing capacity (Mafrolla & D’Amico, 2017). 
As a consequence, when firms experience financial difficulties, this may create an 
incentive for firms to mask poor financial performance by managing earnings upward. 
Dechow et al. (2010) finds that firms experiencing financial distress are more likely to 
manage earnings upward, while DeAngelo et al. (1994) find that firms close to failure as 
the last stage of financial distress (Nagar & Sen, 2016) are likely to be more conservative 
than non-stressed firms. Therefore, managers of listed firms may adjust their earnings 
management strategy according to their proximity to technical default. 
   When listed firms run a lower risk of financial distress, managers are more likely to 
manage earnings opportunistically (upward) in order to mask weak financial 
performances. However, for firms close to bankruptcy as the final stage of financial 
distress (Habib et al., 2013; Nagar & Sen, 2016), their managers become more 
conservative and less opportunistic in the preparation of financial information (DeAngelo 
et al., 1994).  
   These findings indicate that financial distress impacts on the earnings management 
strategies of listed firms because it enables them to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts. Opler 
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and Titman (1994) find that US listed firms take actions that impact positively yet 
temporarily on operating income in the years approaching financial distress. 
   Mafrolla & D’Amico (2017), analysing a sample of Italian, French and Spanish non-
listed firms, provide empirical evidence that the Basel II regulations, enacted from 2008, 
increase borrowers’ incentives to engage in (income-increasing) earnings management to 
improve their creditwothiness and their borrowing capacities, since the financial 
statements of borrowers are deeply scrutinised by lenders in order to assess their ability 
to repay loans.  
   However, there is a paucity of literature concerning the relationship between financial 
distress risk and earnings management behaviour in non-listed firms.  
   In the extant literature, to our best knowledge, only Campa (2019) investigates earnings 
management initiatives in both listed and non-listed firms experiencing financial 
difficulties, and finds that French firms of both type are likely to manage earnings 
downward as financial difficulties worsen. Unfortunately, the findings of Campa’s 
research do not provide evidence on the impact of financial distress on the earnings 
management incentives of non-listed firms as they only compare the earnings 
management strategies of listed and non-listed firms experimenting financial difficulties. 
   Therefore, since Italian firms are financed mainly by bank loans, the aim of this research 
is to investigate if a deterioration in the financial situation of Italian non-listed firms 
impacts on their earnings management initiatives. More specifically, we investigate 
whether managers of distressed firms are likely to engage in income-decreasing earnings 
management, according to the Jensen (1996) control hyptothesis, or in income-increasing 




   Our research is grounded firmly in the extant literature and contributes to that literature 
by examining the link between financial distress risk and earnings management which is 
underdeveloped in the context of non-listed firms. Our paper focuses on non-listed firms 
as they constitute the vast majority of firms in the European Union (EU, 2019), and 
around 99.8% of firms in Italy. The focus is on firms experiencing financial problems, 
rather than firms facing bankruptcy, as financial distress does not necessarily lead to 
bankruptcy (Habib et al., 2013). The context is interesting as Italian non-listed firms 
predominantly employ debt rather than equity to finance their operations (Poli, 2013a; 
Poli, 2015), and therefore such firms could have incentives to mask poor financial 
performance otherwise their access to credit may be impaired. Our research should 
provide some context for both academics and practitioners when analysing the reliability 
of financial information in Italian non-listed firms suffering from financial distress risk. 
To assess financial distress risk, we employ Altman’s Z-Score, the validity of which is 
confirmed by Altman et al. (2017), and this established approach is employed extensively 
in the empirical literature (see more recently, Habib et al., 2013; Nagar & Sen, 2016; and 
Campa, 2019). Our findings suggest that increasing financial distress risk leads to greater 
income-decreasing earnings management, indicating that firms in technical default are 
more likely than healthy firms to managing their earnings downward.  
   The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature and presents 
our hypothesis development. Section 3 discusses the research methodology employed and 
the study data. The main findings of our empirical analysis are discussed in section 4. 
Finally, section 5 presents our conclusions along with the limitations of the study, as well 




Literature review and hypothesis development 
 
Financial difficulties and earnings management  
According to agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), managers of financially 
distressed firms may engage in earnings management initiatives to mask poor financial 
performance, threatening the interests of the firm’s creditors and lenders (Panda & 
Leepsa, 2017). The extant literature (e.g. DeFond & Jimbalvo, 1994; DeAngelo et al., 
1994; Beneish & Vargus, 2002) suggests that financial distress risk may impact on 
earnings management behaviour, thereby impacting the manager’s accounting choices 
and the quality of financial information.  
   The extant literature investigates whether the degree of financial distress impacts on 
earnings management initiatives and employs a variety of proxies for financial distress. 
Some authors investigate this relationship in the case of those firms violating debt 
covenants as they are likely to be in financial distress (Gilson, 1989). DeFond and 
Jimbalvo (1994) find that US listed firms manage their earnings upward in the year before 
a costly debt covenant violation. Further, Sweeney (1994) finds that US listed firms 
violating debt covenants are more likely to engage in earnings overestimation to improve 
short-term cash flows and firm performance in order to avoid technical default. Dichev 
& Skinner (2002) argue that the direction of the earnings manipulation (underestimation 
or overestimation) depends on the severity of the financial difficulties. In a sample of US 
listed firms, they find that a large proportion just meet the covenant threshold, indicating 
that these firms manage earnings to avoid the expensive debt covenant violations. Jha 
(2013) finds that US listed firms experiencing temporary financial distress manage their 
earnings upward in order to avoid debt covenant violations that may be costly for them.  
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   Smith et al. (2001) study Australian listed firms using a multi-dimensional measure of 
financial distress and cluster firms into three groups, failing, distressed and healthy. They 
find that distressed non-failing firms are more likely to manage their earnings upward 
than non-distressed firms, while distressed firms filing for bankruptcy are less likely to 
engage in income increasing earnings management than other firms. Their findings are 
consistent with DeAngelo et al. (1994) who find that stressed firms are more likely to 
reveal their weak financial performance to stakeholders in order to renegotiate their debt 
on better terms and signal to stakeholders the manager’s willingness to deal with these 
problems. Further, they argue that managers have an incentive to manage earnings 
downward in the case of close auditor and lender monitoring. However, Garcia Lara et 
al. (2009) find that UK failed firms manage earnings upward up to four years in advance 
of bankruptcy in order to mask weak performance, and that such firms use real activity-
based earnings management where accruals-based earnings management is less effective 
or is complex to action (Nagar & Sen, 2016).  
   Some studies in the extant literature use firm bankruptcy as the signal of financial 
distress. Rosner (2003) studies failed US firms and finds that they manage earnings 
upward in the five years leading up to bankrupty. Charitou et al. (2007a, 2007b) find that 
the managers of stressed US firms underestimate earnings in the period before they 
become bankrupt, providing evidence that firms close to failure are more likely to manage 
earnings downward than healthy firms due to the pressure exerted by auditors or lenders.    
Bisogno & De Luca (2015) find that Italian SMEs experiencing financial difficulties are 
more likely to manage earnings upward because of the need to obtain new funding from 
lenders. Nagar & Sen (2016) find that in their initial stages of distress, Indian listed firms 
are likely to cut indirect (SG&A) expenses, and when the distress becomes more severe, 
they increase such expenses while managing earnings upward instead by manipulating 
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discretionary accruals. Their findings indicate that the type of earnings management 
behavior reflects the degree of financial distress. 
   The literature identifies a range of alternative proxies for financial distress. Habib et al. 
(2013) uses three different proxies for financial distress in a study of New Zealand listed 
firms: negative net income; current year working capital, where distressed firms are those 
exhibiting negative working capital in a given year; and a combined variable for firms 
showing negative net income and working capital. They find evidence that firms manage 
their earnings both upward and downward, and that distressed firms have lower leverage 
than their non-distressed counterparts, the latter indicating that higher leverage may not 
be a key driver of financial distress.  
   Finally, many studies employ Altman’s Z-Score as a proxy for financial distress. This 
measure is a linear combination of five key business ratios, weighted by coefficients, 
thereby producing a more encompassing indicator of financial distress (Altman et al., 
2017; Lubawa & Loungrath, 2016). Agrawal & Chatterjee (2015) investigate Indian listed 
firms classified as exhibiting either low or high distress risk according to Altman’s Z-
score. Their findings are interesting as they find that low-distress risk firms are more 
likely to manage their earnings upward than their higher distress risk counterparts, 
consistent with Jaggi & Lee (2002), who explain that while low distress firms try to mask 
weak financial performance (as managers hope their financial problems are temporary), 
the managers of highly distressed firms are likely to more honestly reflect their financial 
problems in order to restructure or renegotiate the firm’s debts. Therefore, the earnings 






Hypothesis development  
   The extant literature provides evidence that managers of distressed firms may engage 
in income-increasing and income-decreasing earnings management initiatives depending 
on the incentives to do so. These two earnings management practices are consistent with 
the debt hypothesis (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986) and the control hypothesis (Jensen, 
1986), respectively.  
   We know that non-listed firms are more likely to be financed by bank debt than listed 
firms (Van Tandeloo & Vanstraelen, 2008; Mafrolla & D’Amico, 2017), therefore, 
managers of these firms have an incentive to manage earnings upward to improve their 
financial performance and meet lenders’ forecasts and expectations. However, Basel II 
regulations have facilitated banks’ abilities to use software technology (Mafrolla & 
D’Amico, 2017) in order to estimate borrower crediworthiness (rating) based on both 
qualitative and quantitative borrowing information, including accounting information. 
Therefore, it is argued that banks have strengthened their monitoring and scrutiny role in 
assessing the borrowing capacity of their clients, expecially for those firms in financial 
difficulties. As a consequence, the managers of these firms are less likely to manage 
earnings downward, since accrual-based earnings management is a technique easily 
detectable by outsiders (Cohen et al., 2008). In this case, earnings management may be 
very costly for the firm because it erodes its relationship with lenders, thereby reducing 
their trust in the firm. Consistent with the control hypothesis (Jensen, 1986), we propose 
the following hypothesis: 
 
Italian non-listed firms experiencing financial problems are more likely to engage in 




Research Methodology  
Sample selection 
   For the purposes of this study, all accounting, financial market, and corporate 
governance data are collected from the Bureau van Dijk Aida Database for the period 
2009 to 2017. The AIDA Database covers 10 years, therefore when the data was collected 
2008 was the first sample year available for analysis, while 2017 was the last. The year 
2008 is used to calculate the change in some of the study variables, therefore our first 
sample year is 2009. The data consists of Italian non-listed stock corporations that, 
according to Italian civil law, are not obliged to prepare consolidated financial statements, 
and which have equity capital exceeding a threshold of €120,000. Consistent with these 
criteria, the population available in the database is 437,949 firms. From the population 
we exclude limited liability companies to address missing data issues, along with finance 
industry firms given the non-standard format of their financial statements and regulatory 
status, and firms filing simplified financial statements as they are not obliged to report 
certain financial information. After eliminating firms with insufficient data for the 
estimation of the variables in our empirical models, the final sample consists of a balanced 
sample of 9,725 non-listed firms, giving a total of 87,525 firm-year observations over the 
nine year sample period of 2009 to 2017. The use of a balanced firm sample allows us to 
include all active firms during the sample period. The number of firms in each industry 
is given in Table 1 along with their two-digit NACE industry code membership.  
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Table 1 shows that the sample firms available in the database are composed mainly of 
manufacturing firms (51.19% of sample firms) and by wholesale and service sector firms 
(33.16% of sample firms). These firms represent around 85% of the sample, consistent 
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with the wider Italian economy at the end of 2017, as noted by the Italian Institute of 
Statistics (ISTAT, 2018).  
 
Identifying firms in financial difficulty 
   As discussed earlier, the literature identifies several proxies for financial distress, 
including: debt covenant violation (e.g. DeFond & Jimbalvo, 1994; Jha, 2013); persistent 
loss occurrence (DeAngelo et al., 1994); bankruptcy status (e.g. Rosner, 2003; Garcia-
Lara, 2009; Bisogno & De Luca, 2015); Ohlson’s O-score default prediction model 
(Ranjbar & Farsad Amanollahi, 2018); firm free cash flows (Mohammadi & Amini, 
2016); the Fich & Slezak (2008) ratio (Campa, 2019); and Altman’s Z-Score (e.g. 
Agrawal & Chatterjee, 2015; Nagar & Sen, 2016; Campa, 2019), the latter used widely 
in the literature.  
   We do not use debt covenant violation as a proxy for the status of financial distress for 
two reasons. First, in Italy debt covenant information is not readily available as it is not 
mandatory and thus not shown in the financial reporting information. Second, Dichev & 
Skinner (2002) criticise the use of debt covenant violation as a proxy for financial distress 
as firms not violating debt covenants may also fail. Further, we do not use bankruptcy 
status as a proxy for financial distress as the data is not available on the Aida Database. 
Finally, we do not employ the indicators used in only a minority of studies, particularly 
given that the results of such studies are in any case similar to those using more standard 
proxies of financial distress. Our focus is therefore on the Altman Z-Score measure given 
its wide use and confirmed validity in predicting a firm’s financial distress in non-listed 
firms (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006; Altman et al., 2017). We argue that it provides a strong 
proxy for firm financial distress.  
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   We employ Altman’s Z-Score as a proxy for financial distress for at least two reasons, 
consistent with Altman et al. (2017). First, the model is used not only to predict firm 
bankruptcy but also wider firm financial difficulties. Second, the measure uses accounting 
rather than market data and is therefore suitable for non-listed firms. Third, it is more 
widely accepted, understood and established as the primary measure of financial distress 
risk in the extant literature (Bisogno et al., 2018). Agrawal and Chatterjee (2015) note 
that Altman’s Z-Score (hereafter, Z-Score) is a score of the overall financial health of a 
firm based on its available accounting data. It is composed of five indicators drawn from 
the financial statements of non-listed firms. Altman’s original Z-Score (1968) model is 
parameterized as given in Equation 1: 
 
𝑍 = 0.012𝑋1 + 0.014𝑋2 +  0.033𝑋3 +  0.006𝑋4 +  0.999𝑋5                                      (1) 
 
Where: 𝑍= Overall Index or Score; 𝑋1 = Working Capital/Total Assets;  𝑋2 = Retained 
Earnings/Total Assets; 𝑋3 = Earnings before Interest and Taxes; 𝑋4= Market Value of 
Equity/Book Value of Total Liabilities; 𝑋5 = Sales/Total Assets.  
 
   The model was subsequently modified by Altman (1983) and Altman and Hotchkiss 
(2006) to apply to non-listed firms, as detailed in Equation 2: 
 
𝑍′ = 0.717𝑋1 +  0.847𝑋2 +  3.107𝑋3 +  0.420𝑋4 +  0.998𝑋5                           (2) 
 
Where: 𝑍′= Overall Index or Score; 𝑋1  = (Current Assets – Current Liabilities)/Total 
Assets;  𝑋2  = Retained Earnings/Total Assets; 𝑋3  = Earnings before Interest and 
Taxes/Total Assets; 𝑋4= Book Value of Equity/Total Equity; 𝑋5 = Sales/Total Assets.  
 
   Three zones are identified for the outcome of the Z-Score: a “safe-zone” where the Z-
Score exceeds 2.90; a “Grey zone” where the Z-Score value falls between 1.23 and 2.90, 
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where it is uncertain whether firms may or may not go bankrupt; and a “distress zone” 
where the Z-Score is lower than 1.23, indicating a high probability of distress and 
financial difficulties within a given time period (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006). Therefore, 
the higher the Z-Score, the lower the probability that a firm fails. In this paper we 
investigate the relationship between the earnings management behaviour of non-listed 
firms and their Altman Z-Score. We operationalise this by means of a categorical 
financial distress variable which takes the value of 0 for observations in “safe-zone”; the 
value of 1 for observations in the “grey-zone”, which includes firms not suffering severe 
financial problems, and the value of 2 for observations in the “distress zone”, which 
includes firms in financial difficulty. Therefore, as the value of the categorical variable 
increases, the severity of firm financial problems increases. 
 
Measurement of  accrual-based earnings management  
   Consistent with the extant research, discretionary accruals are employed to proxy for 
accrual-based earnings management as they reflect subjective accounting choices made 
by the firm (Lazzem & Jilani, 2018). According to Yang et al. (2009), the higher the value 
of firm discretionary accruals, the greater that earnings are managed. Further, 
discretionary accruals may take the form of either income-increasing (positive 
discretionary) or income-decreasing (negative discretionary) accruals. For the purpose of 
this paper, we use signed discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management 
rather than their absolute value (Ugrin et al., 2017). Chen et al. (2007) argue that 
managers may inflate earnings (managing them upward) to make their firm financial 
performance more attractive to investors. Conversely, Givoly & Hayn (2000) argue that 
negative discretionary accruals indicate that economic losses are recognised in a timely 
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fashion by the firm. Such earnings underestimation signals conservatism rather than 
managerial opportunism (Ugrin et al., 2017). 
   To decompose total accruals into its discretionary and non-discretionary components 
we use the Dechow et al. (1995) model. To control for heteroscedasticity, all of the model 
variables are standardised using opening total assets. This model is estimated using a 
cross-sectional approach, and so the coefficients are industry- and year-specific rather 
than firm-specific, the latter using a time series approach (Yang et al., 2009). 
   Total accruals at time t (𝑇𝐴𝑡) is defined as the difference between accounting earnings 
(net income before extraordinary items) and operating cash flows, consistent with 
Subramanyam (1996). However, since 2015, cash flow statements are not mandatory for 
Italian non-listed firms, and thus in this paper we estimate total accruals from the format 
of the financial statements adopted by such firms according to Italian civil law. Therefore, 
we define total accruals as given in Equation 3:  
 
𝑇𝐴𝑡 = (∆𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡 − ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡) − (∆𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑡) 
− 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  (3) 
 
   DeAngelo (1981) defines abnormal total accruals as the difference between total 
accruals and normal (expected) total accruals. Therefore, total accrual changes from the 
previous year to the current year can be separated into discretionary and non-discretionary 
accrual changes as given in Equation 4:  
 




   Applying the modified version of the Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995), total accruals 













+ 𝜀𝑡 (5) 
 
Where: 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = total accruals for firm i in year t; Δ𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = revenues for firm i in year t 
less revenues in year t–1; ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑡 = receivables for firm i in year t less receivables in year 
t–1; 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = property, plant and equipment + long-term deferred expenses for firm i in 
year t; 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 = total assets in year t–1; and 𝜀𝑡 = the model error term. 
 
   To estimate the coefficients in Equation 5, we use a cross-sectional regression approach, 
including all firms within the same first two digit NACE code. The model implicitly 
assumes that all firms within a given industry and year share the same incentive for 
earnings manipulation. Consistent with Dechow et al. (1995), discretionary accruals are 
then calculated as the difference between total and expected accruals, that is, the error 














+ 𝜀𝑡) (6)  
 
   As we hypothesise that firms experiencing financial difficulties are likely to manage 
their earnings downward, we focus on income-decreasing earnings management as the 
dependent variable in the main model, Model 1. In addition, we propose an additional 
control model using income-increasing earnings management (Model 2) as dependent 
variable. If our hypothesis is supported, in Model 1 we expect a significant positive 
relationship between the degree of financial distress and the dependent variable EM1 (the 
income-decreasing earnings management), as managers may manage earnings downward 
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when the severity of their financial difficulties increase. As a consequence, in Model 2 
we expect a negative relationship between the degree of financial distress and the 
dependent variable EM2 (income-increasing earnings management).  
   To compute negative discretionary accruals (dependent variable EM1) all positive 
values of discretionary accruals are set to zero to reflect only income-decreasing earnings 
management. The second measure of earnings management (dependent variable EM2) 
captures positive abnormal accruals, and so all negative values of discretionary accruals 
are set to zero to reflect income-increasing earnings management alone.  
 
The empirical model  
To test our hypothesis, the model given in Equation 7 is estimated in order to examine 
the relationship between signed discretionary accruals and financial distress risk for non-
listed firms. We introduce Altman’s Z-Score as a categorical variable labelled DISTRESS. 
The variable takes the value of 0 for observations in the safe zone (where the Z-Score is 
greater than 2.9), the value of 1 for observations in the grey area (where the Z-Score is 
between 1.23 and 2.9), and the value of 2 for observations in the distress zone (where the 
Z-Score is lower than 1.23).  
 
𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽3𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +
 𝛽6𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝐶𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐶𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (7) 
 
Where: 𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 is the dependent variable of the main model (M1), reflecting income-decreasing earnings 
management, computed according to the modified Jones’ model (Dechow et al., 1995). We also employ 
the following control dependent variable: EM2 which proxies for income-increasing earnings management. 
Here after we list the testing and control variables.  𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = categorical variable for Altman’s Z-
Score, assuming the value of 0 for observations in safe zone, 1 for observations falling into the grey area, 
and 2 for observations falling into the distressed zone. In the regression model, the base for the categorical 
variable is zero. 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡  = firm leverage, measured as loans to total assets; 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡  = natural logarithm of 
total assets; 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡 = firm’s growth rate measured as the percentage annual change in revenues; 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖,𝑡  
= tax burden measured as the sum of tax payables and deferred taxes, scaled by income before taxes; 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 
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= return on assets ratio; 𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = the signed value of total accruals; 𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝐶𝐻𝑖,𝑡 = dummy variable taking 
the value of 1 if a firm issued new debt compared to the previous year; 𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐶𝐻𝑖,𝑡 = dummy variable taking 
the value of 1 if a firm issued new equity compared to the previous year; and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  = model error term.  
 
   The test variable DISTRESS is categorical such that it takes the value 0 for observations 
in the safe zone, the value 1 for observations in the grey zone, and the value 2 for 
observations in the distressed zone. In the regression model, we use the categorical 
dependent variable of zero (safe zone) as the base. Therefore, we expect a positive sign 
for the variable DISTRESS assuming the value of 1 (grey zone) and 2 (distress zone). 
These findings would suggest that with an increase in financial difficulties, firms are more 
likely to engage in income-decreasing earnings management initiatives than healthy firms 
(where the variable DISTRESS assumes the value of zero). In other words, as the 
dependent variable EM1 proxies negative discretionary accruals, we expect that the 
greater are the firm’s financial difficulties, the greater are income-decreasing earnings 
managements initiatives. This is consistent with the control hypothesis (Jensen, 1986).   
   Consistent with the extant research examining the determinants of earnings 
management, Equation 7 includes several control variables (Dechow et al., 1995; Kothari 
et al., 2005; Jelinek, 2007; Dechow et al., 2010; Mariani et al., 2010; Bisogno, 2012; 
Habib et al., 2013; Shan et al., 2013; Agrawal & Chatterjee, 2015; Bisogno & De Luca, 
2016; Humeedat, 2018; Lazzem & Jilani, 2018; Ranjbar & Farsad Amanollahi, 2018; 
Campa, 2019) which are likely to impact on earnings management initiatives.  
   We control for the impact of leverage on earnings management. The literature provides 
mixed findings about the relationship between leverage and accrual-based earnings 
management. Because Italian non-listed firms rely more on external capital to finance 
their operations (Mafrolla & D’Amico, 2017), it is argued that managers of firms in 
financial difficulties attempt to manage their earnings downward. As lenders estimate 
borrower creditworthiness focusing on accounting information, there could be high 
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political costs (Watts & Zimmerman, 1978) if they discover earnings management 
initiatives (Mafrolla & D’Amico, 2017). Therefore, non-listed firms are monitored 
closely by lenders and we expect that more highly leveraged firms are more likely to 
manage earnings downward than lower leveraged firms, consistent with the control 
hypothesis (Jensen, 1986).  
   We control for firm growth (proxied by the change in sales) as it impacts on the degree 
of earnings management. Skinner & Sloan (2002) argue that the market penalises growing 
firms in the case of negative earnings surprises. In addition, the managers of growing 
firms may have an incentive to smooth earnings by managing accruals since earnings 
volatility may increase firm risk (Beaver et al., 1970). Gorganli & Vakilifard (2014) argue 
for a positive relationship between firm growth and accounting discretion in listed firms, 
though find a negative relationship between the two, indicating that managers of firms 
with growth opportunities engage less in earnings management. Therefore, we expect a 
positive relationship between firm growth and negative abnormal accruals (income-
decreasing earnings management).  
   We control for firm profitability. DeAngelo et al. (1994) argue, and find evidence, that 
managers of firms experiencing financial difficulties are less likely to inflate earnings to 
mask their poor financial performances, and such firms are instead likely to manage 
earnings downward. By reducing their reported earnings, managers attempt to signal to 
lenders and other creditors their financial difficulties in order to negotiate better terms in 
contract renegotiations. Therefore, managers of firms experiencing financial difficulties 
are likely to manage earnings downward. Agrawal & Chatterjee (2015) find a negative 
relationship between discretionary accruals and firm profitability for listed firms, 
suggesting an income-decreasing earnings management strategy. Thus, we expect a 
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positive relationship between firm profitability and income-decreasing earnings 
management.  
   We control for the impact of firm size on earnings management, though there are 
competing views on the direction of relation. One view is that larger firms are less likely 
to manage earnings than other firms as they have better internal control systems to reveal 
such activity (Francis et al., 1999), and that such activity would damage their financial 
market reputation (Charitou et al., 2011; Habib et al., 2013; Nalarreason et al., 2019). 
Further, larger (listed) firms are in general audited by more highly qualified and 
competent auditors that limit earnings management behaviour. The altenative view argues 
that larger firms are more likely to manage their earnings than other firms given their 
concern to meet analysts expectations and their greater bargaining power with auditors 
(Habib et al., 2013; Agrawal & Chatterjee, 2015). Campa (2019) finds a negative 
relationship between income-increasing discretionary accruals and firm size in French 
listed and non-listed firms. Francis et al. (1999) argues that larger non-listed firms are 
less likely to manage their earnings due to better internal control systems. The majority 
of Italian listed and non-listed firms adopt the traditional corporate governance model and 
are therefore subject to an administrative audit carried out by an internal though 
independent statutory committee (Board of Statutory Auditors) that should increase the 
quality of their internal control systems (Bisogno, 2012; Bisogno & De Luca, 2016). 
Therefore, we expect a positive relationship between firm size and income-decreasing 
earnings management in Italian non-listed firms. 
   We control for the impact of taxation on the magnitude of discretionary accruals as the 
extant literature finds that managers of firms tend to underestimate earnings when the tax 
burden for the year increases (Burgstahler et al., 2006; Coppens & Peek, 2005; Poli, 
2013). Garrod et al. (2007) argue that profitable firms underestimate earnings to minimize 
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tax payments as they attempt to avoid the political cost of a tax audit that may be costly 
for the firm, and find evidence of this. Thus, non-listed firms may engage in income-
decreasing earnings management to minimise corporate tax payments. Therefore, we 
expect a positive sign between income-decreasing initiatives and the size of corporate tax 
payments. 
    We also control for the impact of total accruals on earnings management since the 
literature finds that firms with greater total accruals make higher discretionary accruals. 
Francis et al. (1999) argue that firms generating higher accruals have a greater incentive 
to manipulate earnings aggressively and opportunistically. Therefore, a negative relation 
is expected for this control variable and income-decreasing earnings management.  
   Finally, we control for the impact of debt or equity issuance as Shan et al. (2013) find 
that firms with large external financing cash inflows (outflows) tend to engage in income-
increasing (decreasing) earnings management, regardless of whether their financing is via 
debt or equity. Campa (2019) finds a positive relationship between debt and equity 
issuance and the level of positive discretionary accruals, indicating the use of income-
increasing earnings management initiatives. Therefore, we expect a negative relationship 
between the magnitude of negative discretionary accruals (income-decreasing earnings 
management initiatives) and debt and equity issuance.  
   The model coefficients are calculated using robust standard errors clustered by firms 
and years, consistent with Petersen (2009). Table 2 provides more detailed definitions of 
the model variables, along with expected coefficient signs. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Data analysis and results  
Descriptive statistics  
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Table 3 gives the descriptive statistics for our continuous model variables. Panel A shows 
the descriptive statistics for the full sample, while panel B shows the descriptive statistics 
for firms grouped by the DISTRESS test categorical variable. Panel A shows the 
descriptive statistics for the full sample of 9,725 firms and 87,525 observations. 
Untabulated statistics show that 49.16% (43,024) of sample firm-year observations 
evidence income-decreasing earnings management, while 50.84% (44,501) of the firm-
year observations evidence income-increasing discretionary accruals, suggesting that, on 
average, sample firms are quite balanced between managers engaging in both income-
decreasing and income-increasing earnings management initiatives. With regard to the 
full sample, the dependent variable for income-decreasing earnings management, EM1, 
has a mean of -0.030, while the (control) dependent variable EM2 for income-increasing 
earnings management has a mean of 0.031.  
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
   Firms in the total sample have a mean financial leverage ratio of 0.213, indicating that 
bank loans are around 21.3% of firm total assets. Firms have a mean growth rate of 49.3%, 
and firm profitability shows that net income is around 4.3% of total assets. Average firm 
size (natural logarithm of total assets) is 10.051 (or around 23 million euros). On average, 
firms have tax payable and accrued tax burden of around 40.4% of net income before 
taxes. Firm sample total accruals are, on average, -0.027. 
   In addition, we analyse the characteristics of firms grouped according to their financial 
situation (safe zone, grey zone or distress zone) to observe the earnings management 
initiatives engaged in by firms according to their Z-Score. We therefore examine 
descriptive statistics of our continuous dependent and independent variables for sample 
firms grouped by the DISTRESS categorical variable in Panels B to D.  
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   The dependent variable EM1, which captures income-decreasing earnings management, 
has a mean of 0.028 for firms in the safe zone (9.39% of firm-year observations), a mean 
of -0.029 for firms in the grey zone (69.42% of firm-year observations), and a mean of -
0.037 for firms in the distress zone (21.19% of firm-year observations). These findings 
suggest that managers of firms in the distress zone are more likely to manage earnings 
downward than managers of other firms.  
   In order to control for the impact of the testing and independent variables on the income-
increasing earning management initiatives, we also use the control dependent variable 
EM2. This control variable captures income-increasing earnings management (that inflate 
earnings) has a mean of 0.041 for firms in the safe zone (9.39% of firm-year 
observations), a mean of 0.031 for firms in the grey zone (69.42% of firm-year 
observations), and a mean of 0.025 for firms in the distress zone (21.19% of firm-year 
observations). This findings suggest that managers of distressed firms are less likely to 
manage earnings upward than other firms, while firms in the grey zone are likely to 
manage earnings upward heavily. 
   The financial leverage variable, LEV, shows that 18.9% of total assets are financed by 
bank loans for firms in the safe zone, while the ratio is 20.7% for firms in the grey zone, 
and 24.4% for firms in the distressed zone. Clearly, financial difficulties increase with 
firm leverage. 
   The sales growth variable, GROW,  the net sales from the previous year, has a mean of 
33.1% for firm-year observations in the safe zone, 58.8% for firm-year observations in 
grey zone, and 25.3% for firm-year observations in distress zone. Thus, firms in the grey 
zone tend to enjoy better growth than other sample firms. Firm profitability, ROA, is 
around 6.2% for firms in the safe zone, 5.1% for firms in the grey zone, and 1.1% for 
firms in the distress zone. Thus, as expected, firm profitability tends to deteriorate as 
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financial difficulties deepen. Firm size, SIZE, (natural logarithm of total assets) has a 
mean of 9.613 for firms in the safe zone, 9.935 for firms in the grey zone firms, and 
10.627 for distress zone firms. Thus, distressed firms tend to be larger than other firms, 
and grey zone firms tend to be larger than healthy firms. The variable which gauges the 
tax burdern, TAX, shows that taxes are 39.4% of income before taxes for firms in the safe 
zone, 41.9% for firms in the grey zone, and 36% for firms in the distressed zone. Finally, 
the table shows that signed total accruals of -0.013, -0.025, and -0.042 are generated by 
safe zone, grey zone and distressed zone firms, respectively.  
   Table 4 shows descriptive statistics for the dummy and categorical variables in our 
model. Panel A reveals that 53.24% of sample firms (46,595 firm-year observations) 
increased their total debt (DEBTCH) while only 5.90% of firms (7,595 firm-year 
observations) increased their equity (EQUTCH) during the year. Descriptive statistics for 
firms grouped by the financial distress risk categorical variable, DISTRESS, indicate that 
firms in the distressed zone (DISTRESS = 2) tend to increase their debt somewhat less 
(50.44%) than other firms. 53.3% of firms in the grey zone (DISTRESS = 1) and 58.54% 
of firms in the safe zone (DISTRESS = 0) increase their debt compared to the previous 
year. These findings suggest that while healthy firms are more likely to increase their debt 
to finance their operations, firms in financial difficulty may be less able to do so given 
their increased financial risk as a borrowing proposition and the fact that they may be 
required to repay their loans before maturity if they breach covenant requirements. Futher, 
firms in the safe zone are more likely to increase equity (7.55% of firm-year observations) 
to finance their operations than financially riskier firms (5.77% and 5.62% of firm-year 
observations in the grey and distressed zones, respectively). Therefore, as firm financial 





 [Insert Table 4 here] 
 
   Table 4, panel B, shows that 9.39% of the (8,215) observations fall in the safe zone (Z-
Score coded 0), 69.42% of the (60,760) observations fall in the grey area (Z-Score coded 
1), and 21.19% of the (18,550) observations fall in the distress zone (Z-Score coded 2). 
Thus, less than 10% of firms are classed as healthy, while around 70% may experience 
some financial difficulties and around 21% are distressed. 
 
Correlation analysis  
   Table 5 shows a correlation matrix for the full sample of firms with Pearson (Spearman) 
correlations given below (above) the diagonal. To capture the relationship between 
financial distress risk and earnings management initiatives, we examine the categorical 
test variable, DISTRESS, whereby the safe zone is coded 0, the grey zone is coded 1, and 
the distressed zone is coded 2.  
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
   The table shows a negative  Pearson correlation of 0.015 between the dependent 
variable EM1 (income-decreasing earnings management) and the test variable DISTRESS 
when it takes the value 0 (safe zone) which is significant at 1% level. There is a significant 
positive Pearson correlation (0.050) at 1% level, between the dependent variable EM1 
and DISTRESS when it takes the values of 1, the grey zone, and a negative Pearson 
correlation (-0.066), significant at 1% level, between the dependent variable EM1 and 
DISTRESS when it takes the values of 2, the distress zone. The Pearson correlation is 
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positive (0.062) and significant at 1% level, between the income-increasing earnings 
management dependent variable EM2 and DISTRESS when it takes the value 0 (safe 
zone). There is a positive correlation of 0.009 which is significant at the 1% level between 
EM2 and DISTRESS when it takes the value 1 (grey zone), and a negative correlation of 
-0.055 between EM2 and DISTRESS when it takes the value 2 (distressed zone). These 
findings suggest that managers of distressed firms are likely to engage less in income-
decreasing earnings management (EM1) and less in income-increasing earnings 
management initiatives (EM2).  
   The table shows a negative Pearson correlation which is not significant between EM1 
and LEV and the control variables GROW and EQUTCH, while the correlation is positive, 
though insignificant between EM1 and SIZE and TAX. The Pearson correlation is positive 
and significant at the 1% level between EM1 and the control variables ROA (0.163) and 
TACC (0.693). Finally, the correlation is negative and significant at the 1% level between 
EM1 and DEBTCH (-0.070).  
   The table shows a positive Pearson correlation, which is significant at the 1% level, 
between EM2 and ROA (0.170), TACC (0.679) and EQUTCH (0.051). There is a negative 
correlation, which is significant at the 1% level, between EM2 and LEV (-0.074), SIZE (-
0.026), and DEBTCH (-0.092).  
   Leverage is correlated negatively with both income-decreasing (EM1) and income-
increasing (EM2) earnings management initiatives, indicating that leveraged firms, 
consistent with DeAngelo (1994), are likely to reduce earnings management initiatives. 
Firms issuing new debt and larger firms are likely to increase income-decreasing (EM1) 
and reduce income-increasing earnings management (EM2), indicating that such firms 
are likely to smooth their earnings. The positive correlations between both EM1 and EM2 
and TACC suggest that the overall measure of earnings management (proxied by both 
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income-decreasing and income-increasing earnings management initiatives) are related 
to the overall measure of total accruals, as in the previous literature.  
   There is a positive Pearson correlation, significant at the 1% level, between the control 
variables ROA and DISTRESS when it takes the value 0 (0.066) and 1 (0.125), while the 
correlation is negative and significant at the 1% level when DISTRESS takes the value 2 
(-0.187). These findings confirm that firms in the safe and grey zones are in general more 
profitable than distressed firms. Moreover, the Pearson correlation between ROA and LEV 
is negative (-0.276) and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that more leveraged firms 
have lower profitability due in part to the interest paid on loans. The correlation between 
SIZE and DISTRESS when it takes the value 0 (safe zone) and 1 (grey zone) are negative 
and significant at the 1% level (-0.130 and -0.162, respectively), though it is positive and 
significant at the 1% level when DISTRESS takes the value 2 (distressed zone). Therefore, 
distressed firms tend to be larger than other firms.  
 
 
Results and discussion  
Table 6 presents the results of our empirical model to test the impact of firm financial 
difficulties on earnings management behaviour. Consistent with Campa (2019), the 
model uses the categorical test variable DISTRESS which takes the value 0 when the Z-
Score is higher than 2.9 (safe zone), the value 1 when it lies between 1.23 and 2.9 (grey 
zone), and 2 when it falls below 1.23 (distressed zone).  
 




   From our hypothesis which is based on the control hypothesis (Jensen, 1986) we expect 
a positive relationship between financial distress risk (Z-Score) and income-decreasing 
earnings management behaviour (dependent variable EM1). Consistent with DeAngelo 
et al. (1994), we expect that firms suffering from financial difficulties (high Z-Scores) are 
likely to manage their earnings downward. Therefore, we expect a positive relationship 
between the categorical independent variable DISTRESS and the dependent variable 
EM1, proxying the income-decreasing accrual-based earnings management (negative 
discretionary accruals).  
   To confirm our hypothesis, we also employ a dependent control variable, EM2, 
reflecting income-increasing earnings management (positive discretionary accruals). 
Therefore, we compare the findings of our main Model 1 (dependent variable EM1) with 
those of the control Model 2 (dependent control variable EM2). We run an ordinary least 
squares regression with robust standard errors clustered by both firm and year, consistent 
with Petersen (2009). This helps us to control for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. 
Further, the model controls for both industry sector and year. Our main empirical model, 
Model 1 with EM1 as dependent, has an R-square of 67.26% and an F-test significant at 
the 1% level. The control Model 2 (using EM2 as dependent variable), has an R-square 
of 65.97%, with an F-test significant at the 1% level.  
   The test categorical variable, DISTRESS, has three categories: 0 for the safe zone, 1 for 
the grey zone, and 2 for the distressed zone. Since the purpose of this paper is to 
investigate whether the severity of a firm’s financial problems induces managers to 
manage their earnings downward, we employ the safe zone as the base case in our 
regression model. We first comment on the findings of Model 1, the negative value of 




   The results show that the DISTRESS variable coefficient is positive, as expected, and 
significant at the 1% level for firms in both the grey and distress zones. These findings 
indicate that when the financial difficulties increase managers of these firms are likely to 
manage their earnings downward. The results are consistent with the prior literature 
(DeAngelo, 1994; Charitou et al., 2007a; 2007b; Campa, 2019) and suggest that managers 
of firms in financial distress face political costs (Watts & Zimmerman, 1978) related to 
the increased monitoring and scrutiny of outsiders (mainly creditors and lenders). The 
findings are also confirmed by the coefficients of the DISTRESS variable in Model 2 
which for firms in the grey and distress zone has a negative sign which is significant at 
the 1% level. These findings suggest that there is a negative relation between firm 
financial difficulties and the probability of managing earnings upward. In conclusion, 
consistent with DeAngelo et al. (1994), stressed firms are more likely to reveal their weak 
financial performance to stakeholders in order to renegotiate their debt on better terms 
and to signal to stakeholders the manager’s willingness to deal with these problems. 
Further, DeAngelo et al. argue that managers have an incentive to manage earnings 
downward in the case of close auditor and lender monitoring, as noted by Etemadi et al. 
(2013). Within the traditional corporate governance system, adopted by the majority of 
Italian listed and non-listed firms, the Board of Statutory Auditors (BSA), an independent 
and skilled statutory auditor which submits firms to frequent administrative audit 
(Bisogno, 2012), works to monitor the day-to-day prudence of operations on behalf of 
both minority shareholders and external stakeholders. Therefore, we find support for our 
central hypothesis.  
   We move on to examine the possible incentives motivating managers to decrease firm 
earnings when firms experience financial difficulties by examining the model control 
variables. In Model 1, LEV is positive and significant at the 1% level and thus, consistent 
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with expectations, more indebted firms are more likely to manage their earnings 
downward. The result is consistent with Jensen’s (1986) control hypothesis, which 
indicates a negative relationship between leverage and earnings management (that is, 
firms managing earnings downward) due to the scrutiny and the monitoring role of 
outsiders (including lenders). This finding may be also explained by managers having an 
incentive to report financial difficulties in order to obtain better conditions in debt 
renegotiations (DeAngelo et al., 1994). Further, since firms in financial difficulties are 
under the monitoring and scrutiny of lenders, an income-increasing earnings management 
initiative would be costly since discretionary accruals may be easily detected by outsiders 
(Graham et al., 2005). The finding is also confirmed by the negative LEV coefficient in 
Model 2, which is significant at the 1% level, indicating that leveraged firms engage less 
in income-increasing earnings management initiatives.  
   The coefficient of the control variable GROWTH, measured as the change in net sales, 
is positive, as expected, though it is not significant in Model 1. This finding is not 
consistent with Gorganli & Vakilifard (2014). The sign of this control variable in Model 
2 indicates that managers with growth opportunities are also more likely to engage in 
income-increasing earnings management.  
   The coefficient of the profitability control variable ROA is positive, though it is not 
significant in the main Model 1. In Model 2, contrary to the extant literature (e.g. Dichev 
& Skinner, 2002; Agrawal & Chatterjee, 2015), we find a not insignificant relationship 
between firm profitability and income-increasing earnings management.  
   In Model 1, the coefficient of the control variable firm size (SIZE) is positive, consistent 
with expectations, and is significant at the 1% level. This indicates that managers of larger 
non-listed firms experiencing financial difficulties have more incentive to manage 
earnings downward. The control Model 2 which focuses on income-increasing earnings 
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management, shows a negative relationship between firm size and (income-increasing) 
earnings management which is significant at the 1% level. This finding, consistent with 
the prior literature (Francis et al., 1999), indicates that larger firms are less likely to 
manage earnings upward because of their better internal control systems. The results 
across the two models suggest that the managers of larger firms manage their earnings to 
meet an expected earnings level in order to avoid political costs (Garrod et al., 2007) 
related to financial distress, for example to avoid debt covenant restrictions.  
   As expected, in Model 1, the tax burden, TAX, is significantly positively associated with 
income-decreasing earnings management at the 1% level. Thus, firms reduce reported 
earnings in order to minimise corporate tax payments (Garrod et al., 2007) while 
attempting to avoid a tax audit (a political cost). This finding is consistent with the prior 
literature (e.g. Burgstahler et al., 2006; Coppens & Peek, 2005; Garrod et al., 2007; Van 
Tendeloo & Vanstraelen, 2008). Model 2 confirms this relationship since the variable 
TAX has a negative and significant sign at 1% level. 
   The coefficient of the total accruals variable TACC is positive, contrary to expectations, 
and is significant at the 1% level. This finding is not consistent with Francis et al. (1999), 
who find that firms generating higher total accruals are more likely to manage their 
reported earnings upward. This finding is underpinned by the positive and significant 
coefficient at 1% level for the variable TACC in Model 2.  
   The coefficient of the new debt issue variable, DEBTCH, is positive, contrary to 
expectations, and significant at the 1% level in Model 1. This finding is not consistent 
with Shan et al. (2003), while it is consistent with Campa (2019). This finding, consistent 
with the Jensen’ control hypothesis, indicates that managers of firms increasing their 
external financing are more likely to manage earnings downward (increasing negative 
discretionary accruals) rather than upward in order to improve reported earnings. The 
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coefficient of DEBTCH in Model 2 is negative and significant sign at the 1% level, 
indicating that managers of firms issuing new debt are likely to engage less in income-
increasing earnings management initiatives. This finding is consistent with Campa (2019) 
and indicates that managers of firms increasing their external funding are likely to manage 
earnings downward, supporting the control hypothesis (Jensen, 1986). In sum, these two 
findings indicate that managers of firms issuing new debt are more likely to reduce the 
magnitude of earnings management (less income-decreasing and income-increasing 
earnings management) than other firms, confirming the Jensen control hypothesis. 
   In Model 1, the coefficient of the new equity issue control variable, EQUTCH is 
negative, consistent with expectations, and significant at the 1% level. This finding is 
consistent with Campa (2019) and indicates that firms increasing equity funding are likely 
to manage earnings upward. The coefficient of EQUTCH in Model 2 is positive and 
significant at the 1% level, indicating that firms issuing new equity also engage in 
income-increasing earnings management to meet shareholder earnings expectations.  
 
 
Robustness tests  
   In this section we repeat our estimation of Equation 7 using discretionary accruals 
measured by the Kothari et al. (2005) model as, according to the literature (Cohen & 
Zarowin, 2010), it has a higher explanatory power compared to both the traditional and 
modified-Jones models. In fact, following Guay et al. (1996), since discretionary accruals 
reflect manager discretion in managing accruals in order to impact the reported earnings 
to meet or beat outsider’s forecasts, the Kothari et al. performance model should 
anticipate future cash flows to produce a more reliable measure of earnings than cash 
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flows (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). The findings of this first robustness test are shown 
in Table 7.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
   In Table 7, Model 3 reports the findings of the estimation of Equation 7 using the main 
dependent variable EM3, proxying income-decreasing earnings management (positive 
discretionary accruals are set to zero). Model 4 reports the findings of the estimation of 
the equation using the control dependent variable EM4 which proxyies income-increasing 
earnings management (negative discretionary accruals are set to zero). The R-square of 
Model 3 is 64.67% which is lower than the R-square of Model 1 in Table 6. The R-square 
of the control Model 4 is 63.63% which isalso lower than the R-square value of the control 
Model 2 in Table 6. Contrary to Cohen & Zarowin (2010), the results indicate a lower 
explanatory power of the Kothari et al. model compared to the modified-Jones model in 
decomposing total accrual in non-listed firms. The VIF is below 2 for all variables in the 
equation. The models are run with the Petersen (2009) methodology, in the same manner 
as the models in Table 6. 
   Apart from the differences in explanatory power, we find that the signs of the test 
categorical variable Z-Score in the Model 7, assuming the values 1 (grey zone) and 2 
(distressed zone), are consistent with expectations and the sign of the same variable in the 
main Model 1. Contrary to the results of the control Model 2, the results of the test 
variable Z-Score are negative and positive for firms in the grey zone and the distress zone, 
respectively. These findings suggest that, using the Kothari et al. model, managers of 
firms in the grey zone are more likely to manage earnings downward than managers of 
healthy firms, while managers of firms in the distress zone, consistent with the debt 
hypothesis, are more likely to manage earnings upward than managers of healthy firms.  
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   The signs of control variables in Models 3 and 4 are consistent with expectations and 
with those in Models 1 and 2 (Table 6), except for the variable ROA in Model 3 which 
shows a negative and significant sign at the 1% level. This suggests that more profitable 
firms are likely to reduce negative discretionary accruals in order to demonstrate a better 
financial situation to the stakeholders.  
   In the second robustness test, we repeat the estimation of Equation 7 but this time using 
a reduced firm sample. In Table 2 we observe that 84.35% of firms are manufacturers and 
wholesaler, transportation and service firms. and so we focus the analysis on these two 
most representative industry sectors for the Italian environment. As before, we compute 
the main dependent variable EM5 (negative earnings management) and the control 
dependent variable EM6 (positive earnings management) by using the modified-Jones 
model to decompose total accruals. The R-square for Models 5 and 6 are of 65.76% and 
64.96%, respectively, values which are similar to those in Table 6 but higher than those 
in Table 7. These results indicate that the modified-Jones’ model is a good proxy of 
earnings management initiatives in non-listed firms compared to the Kothari et al. model. 
The VIF is less than 2 for all variables in the models, and they are estimated using the 
Petersen (2009) methodology in the same way as the models in Table 6.  
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
   Even though Equation 7 is estimated on a reduce sample (73,827 firm-year 
observations), the test and control variables in Models 5 and 6 maintain the same signs as 
those in Table 6 (Models 1 and 2, respectively), except for where the Z-Score assumes 
the value of 2 (distress zone). This variable assumes a positive and significant value at 
the 1% level, indicating that managers of distressed firms are likely to manage earnings 
upward in order to mask poor financial performance, consistent with the debt hypothesis.  
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   In sum, comparing results of Models 1, 3 and 5 in Tables 6, 7 and 8, respectively, we 
provide empirical evidence that for  the managers of non-listed Italian firms managing 
discretionary accruals downward, those with distressed firms are more likely to increase 
negative discretionary accruals than healthy firms. However, for the control models we 
find mixed results. For firms managing earnings upward (positive discretionary accruals), 
we find that managers of distressed firms (control Model 2) are more likely to reduce the 
magnitude of positive discretionary accruals than healthy firms. Further, managers of 
distressed firms (control Models 4 and 6) are likely to increase positive discretionary 




   This paper aimed to investigate whether firm financial problems, as proxied by the Z-
Score measure, impact on income-decreasing earnings management initiatives. 
Analyzing a sample of non-listed Italian firms, our empirical evidence suggests that, 
consistent with expectations, managers of firms experiencing financial difficulties are 
more likely to manage their earnings downward. Consistent with DeAngelo et al. (1994), 
this indicates that managers of Italian non-listed firms have less incentive to mask poor 
financial performance, attempting to renegotiate their debt on better terms and signal to 
their stakeholders the willingness of managers to address the underlying problems. This 
suggests that discretionary accruals may be less informative for distressed firms since an 
income-increasing earnings management strategy could be perceived opportunistically 
by lenders, that is, as an accounting strategy to mask poor financial performance. Such a 
strategy may reduce the trust of lenders in assessing borrower crediworthiness, since this 
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may reduce the ability to borrow or lead to a higher risk premium charged on any 
borrowing.  
   Concerning the control variables, consistent with expectations and the Jensen (1986) 
hypothesis, the managers of leveraged firms are likely to engage in income-decreasing 
earnings management. Growth opportunities and firm profitability are positively 
associated with both income-increasing and income-decreasing earnings management 
initiatives. These mixed results may be explained by the way EM1 (main dependent 
variable) and EM2 (control dependent variable) are measured. Firm size, contrary to 
expectations, is negatively associated with both income-decreasing earnings management 
(EM1) and income-increasing earnings management (EM2). Thus, the managers of large 
firms are likely to smooth their earnings since they meet the zero threshold, probably to 
reduce political costs (Garrod et al., 2007) arising when a loss or a high net income are 
recognised. As expected, tax is positively related to income-decreasing earnings 
management; as tax increases, managers engage in income-decreasing earnings 
management (EM1) in order to reduce taxable income. At the same time, consistent with 
the political cost hypothesis of Watts and Zimmerman (1978), as discussed in Garrod et 
al. (2007), tax is negatively associated with income-increasing earnings management 
initiatives (EM2). Thus, firms moderate their income-increasing earnings management 
initiatives to reduce taxable income. As expected, and consistent with the extant literature 
(Francis et al., 1999; Mariani et al., 2010; Bisogno, 2012), total accruals drives 
discretionary accruals (reducing income-decreasing and increasing income-increasing 
earnings management initiatives, respectively). Finally, the issue of new debt and equity 
has a mixed impact on EM1 and EM2.  
   Our robustness tests provide qualitatively similar findings to those of the  main models 
in Table 6. Further, we find evidence of higher explanation power of the modified-Jones 
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model when decomposing total accruals. In addition, the second robustness test shows 
qualitatively the same findings as those in the main model (using signed discretionary 
accruals as the dependent variable), indicating that for firms showing negative 
discretionary accruals (income-decreasing earnings management), the managers of 
distressed firms are more likely to increase the magnitude of these accruals than the 
managers of healthy firms.  
   The findings have several implications for academics, professionals and domestic 
standard setters. First, they suggest that a deterioration in firm financial performance 
creates managerial incentives to manage earnings downward, within firms showing 
negative discretionary accruals. However, our robustness tests indicate that for firms 
showing positive discretionary accruals (suggesting income-increasing earnings 
management), the managers of distressed firms are likely to reduce the magnitude of these 
accruals.  
   In sum, financial distress has a positive impact on income-decreasing and a negative 
impact on income-increasing earnings management initiatives suggesting that the 
managers of more distressed firms are, on average, more likely to be more conservative 
than other firms. This may help borrowers and other creditors in assessing firm 
creditworthiness as they need more reliable accounting information. Second, our findings 
support the usefulness of Altman’s Z-Score in a non-listed firm setting for assessing 
financial distress risk. Third, our findings provide support for the control hypothesis, 
suggesting that when firms are under the monitoring and scrutiny of stakeholders, 
managers have a greater incentive to manage earnings downward. This may be explained 
by managers facing political costs due to the higher monitoring and scrutiny of firms in 
financial difficulties that in turn may generate a wealth transfer from owners, managers 
(or both in wholly-owned firms) to third parties (e.g. lenders, tax offices, etc).  
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   Our research suffers from a number of limitations. First, generalization of our findings 
may be limited due to our focus solely on the Italian non-listed firm context. Second , we 
we were unable to investigate the earnings management behavior of bankrupt non-listed 
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Table 1 - Sample firms (observations over the period 2009-2017) 
Code Description Freq. % Number of 
Firms 
1 Mining, Quarrying, Agriculture, forestry 
and Fishing 
540 0.62 60 
2 Manufacturing 44,802 51.19 4,978 
3 Water supply, electricity, gas,  3,150 3.60 350 
4 Construction, real estate activities 5,778 6.60 642 
5 Wholesale and retail trade, transportation 
and services 
29,025 33.16 3,225 
6 Information and communication 2,736 3.13 304 
7 Healthcare and social works 1,494 1.71 166 





Table 2 - Variable description and measurement 
Label Variable description  
EMi,t Accrual-based earnings management dependent variable computed using 
the modified Jones’s model (Dechow et al., 1995). We decompose 
accruals into two categories according to the sign of the abnormal accruals. 
Therefore we create the two following variables: EM1 = income-
decreasing earnings management; EM2 = income-increasing earnings 
management. Our testing variable is EM1, while EM2 is a control variable. 
 
Testing variable Expected 
sign with 
EM1 
DISTRESSi,t Altman’s Z-Score for non-listed firms  (Altman, 2000). The categorical 
indicator takes the value of 0 for firms with an Z-Score exceeding 2.9 
(healthy firms), the value of 1 for firms with an Z-Score between 1.23 and 
2.9 (firms in the grey area), and the value of 2 for firms with an Z-Score 





LEVi,t Firm leverage, measured as the ratio of debt to total assets + 
SIZEi,t Firm size, measured as the natural logarithm of total assets + 
GROWi,t Firm growth, measured as the percentage annual change in sales revenue + 
ROAi,t Firm profitability, measured as the return on assets ratio + 
TAXi,t Firm tax burden, measured as the sum of tax payables and deferred taxes 
to income before taxes 
+ 
TACCi,t Firm total accruals, measured as the signed value of firm total accruals - 
DEBTCHi,t Dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the firm issued new debt 
within the last year, and 0 if it did not 
- 
EQUCHi,t Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the firm issued new equity 








Table 3 - Descriptive statistics for the continuous model variables 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Var. Min. Max. 25th Median 75th 
PANEL A Full sample (Number of firms = 9,725; Number of observations = 87,525) 
EM1 -0.030 0.054 0.003 -0.294 0 -0.041 0 0 
EM2 0.031 0.053 0.003 0 0.278 0 0 0.042 
LEV 0.213 0.179 0.031 0.000 0.656 0.045 0.194 0.345 
GROW 0.493 59.054 3847.34 -1 16,425.7 -0.059 0.023 0.115 
ROA 0.043 0.089 0.008 -2.701 3.751 0.008 0.027 0.069 
SIZE 10.051 1.086 1.179 4.260 16.998 9.313 9.896 10.640 
TAX 0.404 0.564 0.318 -1.997 3.511 0.275 0.371 0.549 
TACC -0.027 0.119 0.014 -9.139 5.703 -0.069 -0.026 0.014 
PANEL B Firms with Altman’s Z-Score of 0 (healthy firms) (Observations =  8,215; 9.39%) 
EM1 0.028 0.055 0.003 -0.294 0 -0.033 0 0 
EM2 0.041 0.060 0.004 0 0.287 0 0.014 0.060 
LEV 0.189 0.187 0.035 -0.007 0.937 0.009 0.143 0.312 
GROW 0.331 13.967 195.07 -1 1255.74 -0.034 0.570 0.180 
ROA 0.062 0.118 0.014 -1.223 1.286 0.012 0.386 0.096 
SIZE 9.613 1.134 1.287 4.260 16.203 8.837 9.446 10.199 
TAX 0.394 0.519 0.270 -1.997 3.511 0.298 0.364 0.503 
TACC -0.013 0.114 0.013 -1.327 1.706 -0.060 -0.013 0.032 
PANEL C Firms with Altman’s Z-Score of 1 (firms in grey-area) (Observations = 60,760; 69.42%) 
EM1 -0.029 0.050 0.002 -0.293 0 -0.040 0 0 
EM2 0.031 0.052 0.003 0 0.287 0 0.002 0.044 
LEV 0.207 0.174 0.030 -0.025 0.897 0.040 0.187 0.339 
GROW 0.588 70.288 4,949.4 -0.999 16,425.7 -0.052 0.027 0.116 
ROA 0.051 0.081 0.007 -1.921 3.751 0.011 0.033 0.078 
SIZE 9.935 0.988 0.977 4.532 16.400 9.268 9.799 10.474 
TAX 0.419 0.537 0.288 -1.997 3.511 0.297 0.376 0.546 
TACC -0.025 0.098 0.009 -2.336 2.426 -0.068 -0.026 0.016 
PANEL D Firms with Altman’s Z-Score of 2 (distressed firms) (Observations =  18,550; 21.19%) 
EM1 -0.037 0.063 0.004 -0.294 0 -0.049 -0.007 0 
EM2 0.025 0.051 0.003 0 0.287 0 0 0.029 
LEV 0.244 0.185 0.034 -0.042 3.333 0.086 0.239 0.373 
GROW 0.253 13.631 185.81 -1 1,767.75 -0.100 0.001 0.082 
ROA 0.011 0.092 0.009 -2.701 1.220 0.000 0.011 0.033 
SIZE 10.627 1.154 1.331 5.792 16.998 9.803 10.454 11.277 
TAX 0.360 0.659 0.434 -1.997 3.511 0.065 0.348 0.585 
TACC -0.042 0.171 0.029 -9.139 5.703 -0.076 -0.033 0.002 
Note: The table shows the descriptive statistics for dependent and independent continuous variables. 








Table 4 - Descriptive statistics for the dummy and the categorical variables 
 Full sample Distress = 0 Distress = 1 Distress = 2 
 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
PANEL A Dummy variables 
 
Variables N. % N. % N. % N. % N. % N. % N. % N. % 
DEBTCH 40,930 46.76 46,595 53.24 3,406 41.46 4,809 58.54 28,331 46.63 32,429 53.37 9,193 49.56 9,357 50.44 
EQUTCH 82,358 94.10 5,167 5.90 7,595 92.45 620 7.55 57,256 94.23 3,504 5.77 17,507 94.38 1,043 5.62 
 
PANEL B Categorical variable 
 
 0 (safe zone) 1 (grey zone) 2 (distressed zone)           
 N. % N. % N. %           
DISTRESS 8,215 9.39 60.760 69.42 18,550 21.19           






Table 5 - Correlation matrix for the model variables (full sample) 
 
 EM1 EM2 SAFE GRAY DISTRESS LEV GROW ROA SIZE TAX TACC DEBTCH EQUTCH 
EM1 1 0.857** 0.044** 0.028** -0.064** -0.031** 0.054** 0.146** -0.004 0.048** 0.926** -0.092** 0.016** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.250) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
EM2 0.329** 1 0.066** 0.026** -0.076** -0.071** 0.054** 0.179** -0.032** -0.003 0.932** -0.093** 0.036** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.316) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SAFE 0.015** 0.062** 1 -0.485** -0.167** -0.056** 0.079** 0.066** -0.141** -0.007* 0.060** 0.034** 0.022** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.039) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GRAY 0.050** 0.009** -0.485** 1 -0.781** -0.046** 0.043** 0.180** -0.152** 0.070** 0.026** 0.004 -0.009** 
 (0.000) (0.008) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.224) (0.010) 
DISTRESS -0.066** -0.055** -0.167** -0.781** 1 0.092** -0.106** -0.250** 0.271** -0.074** -0.072** -0.029** -0.006 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.068) 
LEV -0,005 -0.074** -0.044** -0.053** 0.091** 1 0.001 -0.322** 0.080** 0.118** -0.056** 0.044** 0.069** 
 (0.129) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.807) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GROW -0.001 0.003 -0.001 0,002 -0,002 -0,001 1 0.239** -0.003 0.056** 0.042** 0.288** 0.043** 
 (0.695) (0.352) (0.794) (0.473) (0.533) (0.688)  (0.000) (0.423) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA 0.163** 0.170** 0.066* ,125** -0.187** -0.276** 0,000 1 -0.066** -0.007* 0.173** 0.034** -0.028** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.950)  (0.000) (0.027) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SIZE 0,004 -0.026** -0.130** -,162** ,275** ,062** -0,001 -0.060** 1 -0.136** -0.022** -0.006 0.033** 
 (0.273) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.854) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.076) (0.000) 
TAX 0.000 -0.003 -0. 001 0.006 -0.006 -0.002 0.000 -0.001 -0.006 1 0.020** 0.014** -0.002 
 (0.957) (0.324) (0.744) (0.076) (0.078) (0.555) (0.953) (0.863) (0.075)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.586) 
TACC 0.693** 0.679** 0.039** 0.033** -0.065** -0.045** -0.001 0.254** -0.019** -0.002 1 -0.102** 0.027** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.706) (0.000) (0.000) (0.653)  (0.000) (0.000) 
DEBTCH -0.070** -0.092** 0.034** 0.004 -0.029** 0.041** 0.006 0.017** -0.004 -0.004 -0.083** 1 0.022** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.224) (0.000) (0.000) (0.078) (0.000) (0.224) (0.287) (0.000)  (0.000) 
EQUTCH -0.004 0.051** 0.022** -0.009** -0.006 0.067** 0.016** -0.028** 0.037** 0.000 0.020** 0.022** 1 
 (0.281) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.068) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.975) (0.000) (0.000)  





Table 6 - Linear regression model of the determinants of earnings management 
(main model) 
 
  Model 1 (main model): 
Dependent variable EM1 
(negative DA) 
(obs. 43,024 = 49.16%) 
Model 2 (control model): 
Dependent variable EM2 
(positive DA) 




Coeff. St. err. p-value Sig. Coeff. St. err. p-value Sig. 
Test variable         
DISTRESS:          
Grey zone + 0.003 0.000 0.000 *** -0.004 0.000 0.000 *** 
Distress zone  + 0.002 0.000 0.000 *** -0.003 0.000 0000 *** 
Control variables         
LEV + 0.011 0.001 0.000 *** -0.010 0.001 0.000 *** 
GROW + 0.001 0.001 0.212 *** 0.006 0.002 0.000 *** 
ROA + 0.003 0.003 0.207 *** -0.003 0.002 0.292  
SIZE + 0.001 0.000 0.000 *** -0.001 0.000 0.000 *** 
TAX + 0.003 0.000 0.000 *** -0.003 0.000 0.000 *** 
TACC - 0.506 0.003 0.000 *** 0.489 0.003 0.000 *** 
DEBTCH - 0.001 0.000 0.000 *** -0.002 0.000 0.000 *** 
EQUTCH - -0.006 0.000 0.000 *** 0.006 0.000 0.000 *** 
constant  -0.035 0.002 0.000 *** 0.064 0.002 0.000 *** 
Sample firms (balanced): 
N° firms: 9,725 
N° obs.: 87,525 
VIF<2 for all variables 
Model 1 description: 
F(16, 87524) = 2,085.31 Prob>F = 0.000  
R-squared = 67.26% 
Industry control: Yes 
Model 2 description: 
F(16, 87524) = 2,046.50 Prob>F = 0.000  
R-squared = 65.97% 
Industry control: Yes 
Note: DISTRESS is a categorical variable taking the value of 0 for firm-year observations in the safe zone, 1 for 
observations in the grey zone, and 2 for observations in the distressed zone. In our model, the safe zone is 
omitted in order to test the effect of firms experiencing financial difficulties on their earnings management 
initiatives. Model 1 is the primary model, while model 2 is a control model. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
is less than 2 for all model variables. Variable descriptions and measurement are provided in Table 2. *** = 1% 





Table 7 - Linear regression model of the determinants of earnings management – 
First robustness test (discretionary accruals estimated using the Kothari et al. (2005) 
model) 
  Model 3 (main model): 
Dependent variable EM3 
(negative DA) 
(obs. 42,778 = 48.88%) 
Model 4 (control model): 
Dependent variable EM4 
(positive DA) 




Coeff. St. err. p-value Sig. Coeff. St. err. p-value Sig. 
Test variable         
DISTRESS:          
Grey zone + 0.005 0.000 0.000 *** -0.001 0.000 0.010 *** 
Distress zone  + 0.008 0.000 0.036 ** 0.005 0.000 0.000 *** 
Control variables         
LEV + 0.014 0.001 0.000 *** -0.007 0.001 0.000 *** 
GROW + 0.004 0.001 0.000 *** 0.008 0.001 0.000 *** 
ROA + -0.010 0.003 0.000 *** -0.016 0.003 0.000 *** 
SIZE + 0.001 0.000 0.000 *** -0.001 0.000 0.000 *** 
TAX + 0.003 0.000 0.000 *** -0.003 0.000 0.000 *** 
TACC - 0.498 0.003 0.000 *** 0.475 0.003 0.000 *** 
DEBTCH - 0.001 0.000 0.000 *** -0.002 0.000 0.000 *** 
EQUTCH - -0.005 0.001 0.000 *** 0.007 0.000 0.000 *** 
constant  -0.035 0.002 0.000 *** 0.063 0.002 0.000 *** 
Sample firms (balanced): 
N° firms: 9,725 
N° obs.: 87,525 
VIF<2 for all variables 
Model 3 description: 
F(16, 87524) = 1,924.32 Prob>F = 0.000  
R-squared = 64.67% 
Industry control: Yes 
Model 4 description: 
F(16, 87524) = 1,940.64 Prob>F = 0.000  
R-squared = 63.63% 
Industry control: Yes 
Note: This table shows the first robustness linear regression, using the discretionary abnormal accruals 
estimated by the Kothari et al. (2005) model as dependent variable. The dependent variable EM3 indicates 
discretionary accruals below zero, while the dependent variable EM4 indicates the discretionary accruals above 
zero. DISTRESS is a categorical variable taking the value of 0 for firm-year observations in the safe zone, 1 for 
observations in the grey zone, and 2 for observations in the distressed zone. In our model, the safe zone is 
omitted in order to test the effect of firms experiencing financial difficulties on their earnings management 
initiatives. Model 1 is the primary model, while model 2 is a control model. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
is less than 2 for all model variables. Variable descriptions and measurement are provided in Table 2. *** = 1% 





Table 8 - Linear regression model of the determinants of earnings management – 
Second robustness test (discretionary accruals estimated using the modified Jones 
model)   
  Model 5 (main model): 
Dependent variable EM5 
(negative DA) 
(obs. 36,125 = 41.27%) 
Model 6 (control model): 
Dependent variable EM6 
(positive DA) 




Coeff. St. err. p-value Sig. Coeff. St. err. p-value Sig. 
Test variable         
DISTRESS:          
Grey zone + 0.005 0.000 0.000 *** -0.000 0.001 0.207  
Distress zone  + 0.007 0.000 0.000 *** 0.007 0.000 0.000 *** 
Control variables         
LEV + 0.015 0.001 0.000 *** -0.010 0.001 0.000 *** 
GROW + 0.002 0.001 0.133  0.006 0.001 0.000 *** 
ROA + 0.003 0.003 0.326  -0.005 0.003 0.052 * 
SIZE + 0.001 0.000 0.000 *** -0.001 0.000 0.000 *** 
TAX + 0.003 0.000 0.000 *** -0.003 0.000 0.000 *** 
TACC - 0.497 0.003 0.000 *** 0.472 0.003 0.000 *** 
DEBTCH - 0.001 0.000 0.000 *** -0.002 0.000 0.000 *** 
EQUTCH - -0.004 0.000 0.000 *** 0.007 0.000 0.000 *** 
constant  -0.031 0.001 0.000 *** 0.056 0.001 0.000 *** 
Sample firms (balanced): 
N° firms: 8,203 
N° obs.: 73,827 
VIF<2 for all variables 
Model 5 description: 
F(16, 87524) = 2,422.71 Prob>F = 0.000  
R-squared = 65.76% 
Industry control: Yes 
Model 6 description: 
F(16, 87524) = 2,488.32  Prob>F = 0.000  
R-squared = 64.96% 
Industry control: Yes 
Note: This table shows the second robustness linear regression, using the discretionary abnormal accruals 
estimated using the modified-Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995) as dependent variable. The dependent variable 
EM5 indicates discretionary accruals below zero, while the dependent variable EM6 indicates discretionary 
accruals above zero. Our sample includes only those firms belonging to the most representative industry sectors, 
manufacturing and wholesale firms (n= 8,203 firms; obs. 73,827). DISTRESS is a categorical variable taking the 
value of 0 for firm-year observations in the safe zone, 1 for observations in the grey zone, and 2 for observations 
in the distressed zone. In our model, the safe zone is omitted in order to test the effect of firms experiencing 
financial difficulties on their earnings management initiatives. Model 1 is the primary model, while model 2 is a 
control model. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is less than 2 for all model variables. Variable descriptions 
and measurement are provided in Table 2. *** = 1% level of significance; **= 5% level of significance; *= 10% level 
of significance. 
 
 
 
 
